The U.S. Supreme Court, on June 25, 2012, agreed to consider the issue of whether a “supervisor” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act includes an employee who oversees and directs other workers' daily tasks but has no authority over their formal employment status, (Vance v. Ball State Univ., No. 11-556).
The court granted review of a decision of the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed summary judgment to Ball State University on the Title VII claim of Maetta Vance, a black catering assistant who claimed that white co-workers and supervisors racially harassed her.
The 7th Circuit held, among other things, that Vance failed to establish a basis for employer liability based on purported harassment by either a co-worker or a supervisor.
Vance had contended that one of the alleged harassers, Saundra Davis, actually was a supervisor and not a co-worker because Davis directed her work and did not “clock in” as other hourly employees did. The 7th Circuit, however, found no material factual dispute about the supervisory status of Davis given the lack of evidence that she had the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer or discipline Vance.
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court held that under Title VII, an employer is vicariously liable for severe or pervasive workplace harassment by a supervisor of the victim. If the harasser was the victim’s co-employee, however, the employer is not liable absent proof of negligence. In the decision below, the 7th Circuit held that actionable harassment by a person whom the employer deemed a “supervisor” and who had the authority to direct and oversee the victim’s daily work could not give rise to vicarious liability because the harasser did not also have the power to take formal employment actions against her.
The 2nd, 4th and 9th U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the Faragher and Ellerth “supervisor” liability rule applies to harassment by those whom the employer vests with authority to direct and oversee their victim’s daily work. The 1st and 8th Circuits, along with the 7th in the Vance case, have held that the rule is limited to those harassers who have the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” their victim.
In her October 2011 petition for Supreme Court review, Vance argued that the justices must resolve a “sharp” and “widespread” circuit split over the definition of “supervisor” so that courts can properly determine when to impose vicarious liability on employers in Title VII harassment cases.
This information is intended to be educational and should not be considered legal advice on any specific matter.
